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In the Sttpreme Cottrt of the
State of Utah
AMERICAN FORK IRRIGATION COMPANY,
a corporation; PLEASANT GROVE IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation; and LEHI
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer of the
State of Utah (Successor in Office of Ed H.
Watson, former State Engineer of the State of
Utah); KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a corporation; UTAH POWER & LIGHT
COMPANY, a corporation; SALT LAKE CITY,
a municipal corporation; UTAH AND SALT
LAKE CANAL COMPANY, a corporation;
NORTH JORDAN IRRIGATION COMPANY,
a corporation; SOUTH JORDAN CANAL
COMPANY, a corporation; and EAST JORDAN IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

CASE
NO. 6726

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State Engineer rejected the application of therespondent irrigation companies for a change in the nature
of the use of a portion of their water rights to permit their
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more beneficial use by early' storage and later release for irrigation. The acquisition of additional water or the enlargement of existing rights was not sought, the requested change
being limited to a small part of the water rights concededly
owned by respondents.
At a trial de novo in the District Court on appeal from
the State Engineer's determination, the appellant corporations relied upon the State Engineer's decision that the
change could not be administered by him. The State Engineer was represented by the Attorney General's office at
the hearing in the District Court and the Deputy State Engineer, who formulated the opinion in the State Engineer's
office, was present and testified briefly on other matters
but made no showing, directly or indirectly, as to the impracticability of administering the change. On the other
hand, evidence was introduced to the effect that the proposed plan was feasible and readily could be administered.
After a full hearing before the District Court, the court
found that the change should be permitted and could be
readily administered without detriment to the appellants.
The judgment of the District Court provided:
"That the decision of the State Engineer dated the 2nd
of March, 1949, rejecting plaintiffs' Change Application
a-1945 be, and the same is, hereby reversed and set
aside and said application is hereby remanded to the
State Engineer with directions to re-instate said application a-1945 in the records of the office of the State
Engineer of the State of Utah and to allow and approve
the same with the priority date of the original filing
of the said application, to-wit: the 16th day of January,
1946; provided that such allowance be subject to the
existing rights of the parties hereto and without prejudice to the rights of any and all parties hereto to chal-
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lenge the nature and extent of, or limitations upon, or
use of, any of the water rights of said parties in, and to,
the waters. of the American Fork River."
The application, by its tenns, was limited in its operation to water owned by the respondents. The evidence of
respondents was to this effect. A showing was made before, and adopted by, the District Court that appellants'
rights were intended not to be, and would not be, interfered
with in any respect. The judgment of the court was to the
same effect, saving all rights of the appellants in conformity
with the statute and the cases governing the effect of such
approved conditions. Despite these things, appellants seek
to have such approval reversed by this Court.
In appellants' "Statement of Facts" arel set out the
general issues which they say divide the parties. It is stated
that "the main point is as to whether the owner of an upper
right to use water for direct application may store it for
later season use, when the lower users' rights depend upon
the run-off flow and seepage water from such direct application." This proposition assumes as a fact what the court
found was not a fact, and disregards the evidence that
whether run-off entered the lake in the summer or fall, it
was alike available for the use of the appellants-carry-over
water being the most important phase of the lake supply.
Other propositions contained in appellants' purported
Statement of Facts are likewise slanted.
A statement of the issues dividing the parties from respondents' point of view is whether the appellants are in a
position to prevent a change in the nature of use in the absence of any showing or authorized findings that they would
be detrimentally affected; whether the users from a lower
storage right can forever "freeze" upper rights and prevent
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their more beneficial utilization under the claim that in some
indefinable way the storage might be affected or the time
the return flow enters the lake might be changed, although
no detriment would result; whether there must be some
substantial injury or detriment to authorize users to object to a change in the nature of use by others, or whether
mere fanciful, speculative or infinitesimal effects suffice;
whether users from Utah Lake are in a position to prevent
any alteration whatsoever in the manner of the application
of water in the surrounding areas merely because theorretically any ·alteration might appreciably affect the seepage into the lake; whether the greatest beneficial use of
water in this arid region is to be prevented in the absence
of a showing of prejudice on the part of those objecting;
whether the lower storage right may, either because of the
actual, or supposed inadequacy of the storage area, waste
into Great Salt Lake quantities of water each year many
times greater than are sought to be held back temporarily
by respondents in connection with the proposed change, and
yet say in effect, you might affect the time when our water
enters the lake and therefore, you may not make the highest beneficial use of your water, notwithstanding that during your holdback period, we must release many times the
amount involved in your application because we get too
much water in the lake; whether an application for change
in the nature of use is the appropriate application on which
to base the proposed temporary storage, or whether asapplicants claim a change application or an application to appropriate should have been filed even though respondents
seek neither to exchange water with anyone else nor appropriate any additional water; whether the fact that the
State Engineer rejected respondents' application on the
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ground that it was impractical from the standpoint of administration, deprives the court on appeal in a trial de novo,
particularly when the State Engineer declines to support in
any way his determination in the evidence before the District Court, from considering the practicality of such change
or from making a finding contrary to the State Engineer's
determination; whether under our system of law when a
review by trial de novo is provided by the Legislature, the
State Engineer's decision must be deemed final and binding
no matter what the court on the evidence may find or determine.
We shall discuss these matters in connection with our
argument under the three main headings of appellants' argument.
To further indicate the essential elements of this case
as a preliminary matter, however, we need to mention that
the three respondent corporations, acting for the citizens
of practically all of northern Utah County, own and distribute for irrigation, culinary and domestic purposes, substantially all of the waters of American Fork River between
April fifteenth and October first of each year. Their direct
flow rights are not questioned. There existing a natural
storage basin near Silver Lake Basin, toward the headwaters of the river, they now propose to hold back 1000
acre feet of the waters of the river that they would otherwise use in April or May, and release it in June, July or August when water for irrigation is scarce, in order that their
stream may be sustained in quantity to the extent feasible
for such later irrigation. They propose to accomplish this
holdback only out of waters which they have always used.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF FACfS
We find it necessary to disaffirm a number of the
claimed facts set out by appellants and to add a number of
salient facts not mentioned by them. Some of the statements that are merely colored in their Statement of Facts
we have left to be appraised by the Court without comment in view of the whole record.
In connection with the statement on page 3 of appellants' brief that all of the waters available from Utah Lake
have been fully appropriated and that the waters therefrom
have been, for many years, insufficient to supply the rights
thereto, it should be noted that long after respondents'
rights were initiated, the Kennecott Copper Corporation
applied for, and was granted, new rights (Tr. 344-345); that
thousands of acre feet of water have been wasted into Great
Salt Lake from Utah Lake because of the fact that they
could not be used under existing rights and necessities (Tr.
146-153) and that there are numerous rights secondary to
the appellants that never protested in this case and whose
rights would be affected if any were, prior to any effect
upon appellants' rights.
The elevation of the proposed reservoir site is not 9,000
to 9,500 feet, but between 7,000 and 8,000 feet (Tr. 130,
280). The reservoir site is about 1,000 feet lower than Silver Lake Basin (Tr. 377).
We deny that the record shows that the total maximum
flow which can be diverted and used by respondents at
any time is 300 c.f.s. as asserted on page 5 of appellants'
brief and call attention to Watermaster Searle's testimony
that about 500 second feet can be diverted and measured
over the weir (Tr. 35, 56) and that while he did testify that
between 300 and 350 second feet were turned into their
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canals, he testified that at least part of the excess that
went down the creek during unusually high water was
used through lower diversions (Tr. 44) and that in ordinary years, up to 350 second feet has been diverted (Tr.
350). Any water above the capacity of respondents' canals
has been for a relatively brief period of time (Tr. 63). In
his long experience, on only one day did Watermaster
Searle see any water wasting down th~ natural channel
(Tr. 58).
The appellants recite that whether the capacity of the
respondents' diversion ditches may be required for beneficial use at any time depends upon changing conditions
from season to season and from day to day. The record
does not bear this out, since all the evidence shows that to
the extent the water is available, the respondents have beneficially used the flow of American Fork River up to the total
capacity of their ditches (Tr. 58, 73, 85).
In connection with the table of maximum flows of

American Fork River appearing on page 8 of appellants'
brief, it is significant that the great majority of measurements are substantially less than 300 c.f.s. It must also be
remembered that these maximum flows are measurements
showing the highest point reached in the entire month of
each year. For the other 29 or 30 days of the month and for
a.ll times during the day, except at the particular time of
the measurement in question, the flow was less. Yet this
maximum flow in May of 1934, according to the record cited
by appellants, was only 65 second feet; in the same month of
1939, 190 second feet; in 1943, 184 second feet; in June of
1931, 76 second feet; June, 1934, 28 second feet; June, 1939,
181 second feet; June, 1940, 120; and June, 1946, 200 second
feet. Even at the highest point reached at any single time
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in these years, there would be wholly inadequate water to
fill respondents' ditches.
On page 9 of appellants' brief, it is argued that "Since
it is alleged (R. 9) that the purpose is to withhold the 35
c.f.s. from the 'high-water' flows, and it is also admitted or
established that as these high-water flows at the diversion
point substantially exceed 300 c.f.s. and approach or exceed
400 c.f.s., the entire 35 c.f.s., if not withheld, would reach
the lake immediately." This is the false premise on which
much, if nat all, of appellants' case is based. Contrary to
the "Statement of Facts" of appellants, there is nothing on
page 9 of the record, or nothing in the evidence, or findings,
or ju~gment of the court, whioh warrants the argument that
the intent or effect of plaintiffs' application is to hold back
or utilize a portion of the flow beyond the capacity of respondents' ditches which, unless held back, would flow into
the lake. It is made clear on page 9 of the record, being
respondents' complaint on appeal, that the hold-back would
be of water that would otherwise be consumptively utilized
by respondents, and that any unusually high water that
would be beyond the capacity of respondents' ditches or
would not otherwise be beneficially used, would be permitted to flow directly down the channel as it always had. Respondents endeavor to convert a simple process of water
regulation and control into an impossible task, but as Engineer Richards pointed out, this administration would be
similar to that utilized on countless other streams.
Pages 8 and 9 of the record show that respondents'
complaint, insofar as pertinent to appellants' assertions referred to, stated:
"18. That with the exception of unusually high water,
the said waters of American Fork Creek have been put

\~

I
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to a beneficial use by the said plaintiffs and their stockholders and their grantors and predecessors in interest
during each and every portion of the year and that the
said waters, when beneficially and carefully used, have
not been more than sufficient to supply their necessities for irrigation, stock-watering and domestic purposes; that by reason of the great fluctuation of the
waters of said creek, only a portion of the lands of the
stockholders of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest could be irrigated during the summer and latter part of the irrigation season when the water had
receded to what is commonly known as low-water, and
that, as a result, the high water flow of the river has,
of necessity, been used by the plaintiffs on crops that
could be produced by a limited number of irrigations
"19. That in order to enable the stockholders of the
plaintiffs to produce more valuable crops, it has become
necessary for the plaintiffs to have a portion of the
high-water heretofore used in the irrigating of less
valuable crops, stored for later and more beneficial use
and that it is fior the purpose of permitting
this more beneficial use by the storage of high water
between April15 and June 15 of each year, which high
water has been heretofore appropriated and used for
early irrigation, that the said storage as specified in
said application is necessary.
"20. That these applicants are the owners and have
the right to distribute, operate and control all of the waters for which storage is sought under said application
and that they have diverted and used said water under
claim of right and against the whole world and particularly against the defendants for more than 60 years

,

It thus will be seen that respondents did not seek to

hold back, and they never since have sought to hold back,
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any water that went directly into the lake but only such water as they have otherwise and would otherwise use for irrigation. Appellants' statement that the 35 second feet
hold-back would be water that otherwise would go directly
into the lake is a mere straw man. It is true in exceptionally high water there has been on rare occasions part of the
American Fork River that has not been used for irrigation
but has gone down the natural channel into the lake. We
have never claimed the right to use this water, but the
period when such condition exists is brief and most infrequent and involves not high water in the common acceptance of the term, but exceptionally high or flood water.
When such condition exists, the evidence is dear that the
same run-off can be permitted under respondents' plan to
go down to the lake as in former conditions without the operation of respondents' plan. It involves what Mr. Richards
terms a simple problem of regulation, which the State Engineer did not deny by any evidence at the trial, could be
readily made.
The table on pages 10 and 11 of appellants' brief, purporting to furnish a foundation for a percentage conversion
of the USGS measurements to measurements at the weir in
the mouth of American Fork Canyon is wholly misleading.
By an attempted comparison of peak measurements-one
a month-taken by different persons at different times, in
view of the fluctuations of the stream shown by the evidence
(Tr. 284), a result wholly inconsistent with the facts has
been arrived at. In other words, by applying the 45% increase which appellants claim the table shows of the lower
measurements over the upper, to other USGS measurements
in order to ascertain measurements at the mouth of the
canyon, we get results wholly at variance with the Searli
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reading (upon which very readings appellants have based
their formula of 45%). For example, which we have taken
at random, the USGS maximum reading as shown by the
table on page 8 of appellants brief for May 13, 1944
was 301 c.f.s. The actual Searle measurments at the mouth
of canyon on the same day as shown by plaintiffs' exhibit
L was 224 c.f.s.
In other words, by applying appellants' formula of 45%
increase between the Searle lower measurement and the
USGS measurement, we would get a theoretical flow at
the mouth of the canyon of 301 c.f.s. plus 135.45, or a total
of 436.45 c.f.s.; whereas, the Searle measurement on that
day shows a total flow of 224 second feet in the morning
and 352 second feet in the afternoon.
In every case in which a similar test is made, a similar
or greater divergence will be found. Why is it that the appellants choose to make such a formula the basis of their
argument when they have the actual measurement at the
mouth as shown by plaintiffs' exhibits L and CC? It cannot be because the Searle measurements are inaccurate,
since they were admitted without objctieon, and when tested
on cross-examination, were shown to have been properly
made, and since appellants use the fragments of the Searle
figures as the very basis of their false formula.
The only responsible figures we have for the flow at the
mouth of the canyon are contained in the Searle figures.
The data appearing on page 11 of appellants' brief which ignores these data in favor of assumed data as a result of the
false formula mentioned, is wholly misleading, Moveover,
appellants have selected only eleven years out of twentytwo, which are not consecutive years. On the contrary, on
the same subject, exhibit L shows the following discharge
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at the mouth of the canyon exceeding 400 c.f.s. in the five
consecutive years, which is the period covered by plaintiffs'
exhibit L, and for 1938, plaintiffs' exhibit CC:
1944-None.

(Appellants' assumed table shows 3
days)
1. (No figure in appellants' assumed table)
19451946-None. (No figures in appellants' assumed table)
1947-None. (Appellants' assumed table shows 6
days)
1948- 10. (Appellants' assumed figure shows 16
days)
1949-

3.

1938-

1.

(No figures this late in appellants' assumed table)
(Appellants' assumed figures purport to
show 5 days)

It will be seen that the appellants' argument to defeat
the change is speculative and largely unsupported. However, it is apparent that if the change is made, accurate
measurements-automatic or otherwise----"Can be made so
that any flow beyond the water respondents have beneficially used can be permitted to go directly into the lake without any effect upon such flow by the proposed change.

The purported facts on pages 12 and 13 of appellants'
brief, based also on the false formula of appellants, are likewise misleading. Instead of there being for any substantial
period in excess of 300 second feet flowing at respondents'
point of diversion, the actual available measurements indicc;_te that a flow in excess of 300 second feet even during
May or June is quite infrequent, and that it is highly unusual for the flow to exceed 350 second feet of water, which
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the evidence shows has been diverted and beneficially used
by respondents.
In any event, whenever the flow, including that held
back at the proposed reservoir, exceeds the amount of respondents' rights, it can be readily released and will be, and
under a system of regulation not a tithe as complicated as
almost any operation by which appellants get their water
from Utah Lake.
The inflow figures given on pages 14 to 16 of appellants' brief are relatively meaningless, since Mr. Gardner,
who made up the figures, testified that no matter when the
water was applied on the land, it would reach the lake with
equally beneficial results for appellants, and since the inflow figures include considerable water from other sources.
Appellants make no contention that respondents were
not the owners of the direct flow rights for which a change
was sought (Tr. 7-8).
The Silver Lake Basin area furnishes a natural reservoir about fourteen miles upstream from the mouth of
American Fork Canyon. There is a cut where the mountains come together where the water comes down, and reportedly there was once an old dam there at the cut where
it is proposed to build the new dam (Tr. 22).
There is a measuring device or scale set up on the respondents' weir in the mouth of American Fork Canyon (Tr.
31). About 500 second feet can be diverted and measured
over this weir (Tr. 35). Three hundred second feet of water in the early season going over the weir would go into
plaintiffs' irrigation system (Tr. 35) and even though the
water overflows the weir, it is picked up and diverted at two
points below (Tr. 40). The three companies take care of
between 300 and 350 second feet (Tr. 442). The water that
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they can't take care of goes down the creek bed (Tr. 42).
They have diversions right out of the creek bed and take
more out down there (Tr. 44). When they have as much
as 500 second feet, they turn it into the creek bed (Tr. 44).
American Fork has 5,024 acres of first class water, and
besides this, second and third class rights use high water
(Tr. 57). From April fifteenth, appellants divert up to 350
second feet and in the average year this amount is used for
irrigation (Tr. 58). They use all the water they can get
in their ditches (Tr. 59).
In the early season use, the water is scattered over a
larger area; the late water is confined to a smaller area (Tr.
60). The late water is used in areas nearer to the lake.
The early crops are on higher ground and the water is scattered over them in the early season (Tr. 60).
The maximum flow of water in 1947 was 159 second
feet (Tr. 62). Water applied higher up seeps down later
and is used again for irrigation (Tr. 68). No one has objected to the diversion and distribution of the water by respondents. None of the appellants has ever objected to the
respondents' utilization (Tr. 77-78). The only time anyone ever mentioned respondents' use of water was when
Mr. Gardner, about four years back, asked why some of
the water then being used was not permitted to go down
to the lake (Tr. 82). The land takes more water when it
is raining. Rain seems to open up the ground (Tr. 83).
Secondary rights draw water until July and then they
are cut. There is not enough water the first tum to supply some of them (Tr. 83). All of the water diverted into
respondents' system is used for irrigation (Tr. 85).
Water from North Union Canal gets into respondents'
waste ditches and also from Lindon area. This water does
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not come from American Fork River (Tr. 95). Also, Dry
~eek contributes to waters in that area (Tr. 97). Seepage
from Provo Reservoir Canal may get into this area (Tr.
100).
A. Z. Richards was called and testified in support of
the application as an expert. He was shown to be an enginer of forty-five years experience and specializing as a
hydraulic engineer for most of this period. He had worked
for the State Engineer in 1903 and 1904, and ever since has
had extensive experience in the area involved in this lawsuit. He designed the diversion weir in the mouth of American Fork Canyon as referred to in the evidence (Tr. 116117) and had extensive personal experience with the lands
under the plaintiff companies (Tr. 117). He had also had
practical experience as a farmer (Tr. 117).
Mr. Richards explained the general plan of the application as follows (Tr. 118-120):
"Q. Will you explain the practical operation of
how that storage could be accomplished pursuant to the
terms of the application as an engineering and hydraulic matter?
"A. The application asked for the privilege of
storing water that has been used in the past in a mountain reservoir on upper reaches of one of the branches
of American Fork Creek, and to store it during April
fifteenth to June fifteenth, a maximum storage stream
of thirty-five second feet, and in quantity a thousand
acre feet, to be held back during the highwater period
and released during the low water period to supplement the water that has been and would be and will be
applied on the lands at a later date in the year, thereby
making greater beneficial use of the water.
"Q. Now is such a project, from an engineering
and practical standpoint, feasible, and if so, why?
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"A. In my judgment it is feasible and very well
planned and should be done.
"Q. What would be practical operation of such
a plan, if carried out, with reference to the matter of
diversion and the other related factors in its practical
application.
"A. The diversion of the stream, as it has been
made in years past, has been by means of an accurate
measuring device to divide the water between the three
parties, modified later to divide the water between the
three parties and American Fork City and the school.
The weir was so constructed that although there is a
small part taken out from the large weir it automatically divides it so that this division is as it was before
the school and the City of American Fork took the
water. Now, inasmuch as the divisions have been made
there is no reason why the high water, part of the high
water that they have used in the past and would be entitled to each year according to their method of dividing it, could not be stored in that reservoir, and without interfering with the Utah Power and Light rights
to put its water through those power plants, both of
which I am very familiar with, having made a proof on
both of them, and to so adjust their rights through
their weir below so that there shouldn't be any interference as far as taking more water from the creek
than they would be otherwise entitled to, as I understand the division of the water, if the water was not
stored. There is no reason why that could not bearranged."
At the very time of the trial there was a large stream
of water spilling from Utah Lake into Great Salt Lake.
There was no beneficial use being made of this water (Tr.
121).
Comparatively speaking, the evaporation in Utah Lake

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I:

I I

I.

'.
I'
;'!

I.
:

~~

17
is considerably more than in the high altitudes at Silver
Lake Basin; about twice more (Tr. 123).
The diversion or storage of water under plaintiffs' application would not affect the availability of water to irrigators from Utah Lake to any substantial degree and it was
the best judgment of Engineer Richards that there would
be no detriment or damage to them (Tr. 124). It was further the judgment of Mr. Richards that all the water plaintiffs' canals will carry has been beneficially used by them
in the past.
If the water is held back and used later in the season
as proposed, there is just as much likelihood that it will
reach the lake as if it were used with a larger amount
through the system in the springtime (Tr. 128-129). The
water later in the year would be used on a reduced acreage
and loss by transpiration and evaporation would not be so
great (Tr. 129).
Utah Lake is a perfect evaporation basin and the loss
is about 50~,0 (Tr. 134). Graphs in the commissioner's reports show that Utah Lake reached a compromise in the
last sixty-seven years about 50% of the time (Tr. 135).
When water from the lake spills, inferior rights would be
affected (Tr. 136). It seems self-evident that if there were
any effect upon the Utah Lake rights by the operation of
plaintiffs' application, inferior rights not involved in this
case, rather than defendants' rights, would be affected, assuming for the sake of argument that Utah Lake was affected at all.
There would be no practical difficulties which would
prevent the release of the water from Silver Lake Basin to
hold the stream up for irrigation in July (Tr. 137). The
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ervoirs in making use of the stored water is that as the normal flow of the stream recedes, the company releases the
water from the reservoir and thereby extends the irrigation in a normal way (Tr. 138).

As. Mr. Richards pointed out, we have problems similar
to those to be encountered in this application in every irrigation district whether the water is stored or not (Tr. 144).
"Just because of a little difficulty we don't give up on the
best use of the water" (Tr. 144). Engineer Richards, in
his approximately forty-five years of experience, didn't
know of any practice of the State Engineer cutting off the
right to the use of water merely because it rains (Tr. 145).
David I. Gardner testified that he was lake commissioner and also one of the expert witnesses for the defendants. He conceded that his report showed that there were
about 30,000 acre feet of water spilled from Utah Lake during the non-irrigation season of 1948 (Tr. 146-147). On
February twentieth, the gates were open and were closed on
February twenty-sixth and they were again opened on
March thirtieth and were not closed until May 4th, 1948.
During the latter period there were spilled 21,900 acre feet
of water (Tr. 148). During that period, the volume of flow
spilled varied between 292 and 397 cubic feet per second
(Tr. 149). (As against about 22,000 acre feet wasted from
Utah Lake in one period, respondents wish to conserve 1,000
acre feet, to release it later in the season when there is a
greater need and a greater storage capacity in Utah Lake,
incidentally.) In 1950, the lake commissioner started to
spill on February fifteenth. The volume was between 200
and 275 second feet, and at the time of the trial in March,
1951, about 270 second feet were spilling (Tr. 149). To
the time of the trial, about 15,000 acre feet had been spilled
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in 1950 (Tr. 150). About 150 cubic feet was going to Kennecott at the time of the trial and in 1950, only 75 second
feet (Tr. 151). The witness admitted that he testified under oath in a deposition that the water wasted into Great
Salt Lake was 255 second feet in 1950, less 75 second feet
going to Kennecott Copper, or a net of 180 second feet being wasted (Tr. 153).
It is about 4.1 miles between the lower weir and the
Geological Survey station (Tr. 190~191).
As admitted by Lake Commissioner Gardner, besides
American Fork Creek Battle Creek, Grove Creek, Alpine
Creek and Fort Canyon Creek, as well as Provo River,
through the Provo Reservoir Canal, contribute to the inflow into Utah Lake at his stations 101 to 115 (Tr. 221222). The witness could not tell what part of the inflow
came from Provo River, and did not know how much water had been supplied to this area from Provo Reservoir
Canal (Tr. 223).
The peak of the level of water in Utah Lake usually
is reached in May or June (Tr. 230). Generally speaking,
the draft on the lake is continued until the latter part of
September or the middle part of October, so that any water
entering the lake as inflow up until October of a typical
year, is contributing to a receding lake (Tr.231).
While it is impossible to tell the rate of ground water
movement in the lower area, its rate is about the same,
whether in May, June or July (Tr. 228). It is not humanly
possible to tell when ground water percolation would reach
the lake (Tr. 306).
During the period May first to October first, the outflow from the lake and the evaporation out of the lake are
about equal in terms of acre feet (Tr. 233). Also, the inflow
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into the lake and the evaporation during the same period are
about equal (Tr. 234). The records of the lake commissioner show that in the past thirty-five years for the period
May first to September thirtieth, the computed evaporation
in thousand-acre feet has been 231,000, and the inflow from
all sources 207,000.
The lake commissioner testified that evaporation from
a farm surface would be less than from an open water surface (Tr. 238). He added that he would say that evaporation from an open water surface would be greater than both
evaporation and transpiration from cultivated areas (Tr..
239).
The Silver Lake Basin is on an easterly and southerly
slope and the snow would melt there more rapidly than on
a northerly slope (Tr. 240),
Approximately half of the water that is applied to the
land in the American Fork River area, ultimately finds its
way into Utah Lake for the whole period of the year (Tr.
252). It would be difficult to differentiate between one period and another (Tr. 252). Any water that is contributed
to the lake contributes to its general supply and it makes
no difference when it comes in (Tr. 253).
The flow in American Fork Creek would vary very
much over a day.
The maximum depth of Utah Lake in general at compromise is fourteen feet, but most of the lake is shallower
(Tr. 298).
While the lake commissioner did indicate that the rights
on the lake had not been fully supplied, he did not say that
the defendants rights had not been, or would not be (Tr.
314).
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It is about nine or ten miles from the mouth of the canyon to Utah Lake (Tr. 318).

Mr. Gardner based his testimony of damage upon the
incorrect assumption that no water would be returned from
the reservoir hold-back (Tr. 247-248), and Mr. Earl erroneously assumed that the water held back would be used or
spread over on the same area as the high water was (Tr.
335). Mr. Earl demonstrated almost complete unfamiliarity with the American Fork River and the irrigation systems lli'1der it (Tr. 342). About the only thing he seemed
to know definitely about the ditches was "The water is used
out of them for irrigation. I have observed that." (Tr.
343).
Mr. Earl thought it would make no difference in the
amount of water reaching the lake whether the water was
applied on a large area or a limited area "so long as it was
beneficially used" (Tr. 361). Thereafter, it developed that
the basis of the opinion was so confused and uncertain as
to completely negative its value (Tr. 363-364). He first said
it would make no difference how much water was applied
as far as inflow into the lake was concerned; then that it
would; then that it would make no difference if the water
was all held back to September; and then that it would (Tr.
264-365) . He was unable to support his conclusions
and the court could hardly have given his testimony
any weight (Tr. 365-366).
Mr. Earl further said that an early runoff into the lake
would be preferable, then indicated that it wouldn't, and
then said that as long as it got into the lake "early enough"
it wouldn't make any difference (Tr. 369) ..
Mr. Richards identified plaintiffs' exhibit EE as a hydrograph of the flow of American Fork Creek in 1914 and
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1938 (Tr. 387-388). The practical operation of the project
was explained to the court (Tr. 389-390). The exhibit mentioned demonstrates a practical manner of accomplishing
the proposed hold-back (Tr. 389-390). There would be no
practical difficulty in measuring the inflow into the reservoir (Tr. 391). June lOth, 1947, the flow into the proposed
reservoir site was about 35 second feet; on June nineteenth
of the same year it was 25 second feet (Tr. 402). While
there would be some difficulties in the storage plan, these
would be no different than always encountered in the administration of water rights (Tr. 393). A method would
be used that is common to almost every reservoir. If the
river is running more than the companies have been using
in the past, the excess amount must be turned down-stream
like it would be in any other case where there are rights below entitled to the water (Tr. 393).

The weir at the mouth of American Fork Canyon is a
good weir, and an exceptionally good means of measuring
water (Tr. 3944).
Reference is made to the graphic chart prepared by Mr.
Richards to illustrate the evidence in the case and the official reports before the court. It was demonstrated that inflow based upon high water use of water in the American
Fork area does not begin until the end of the current irrigation season, and that therefore any difference in time
would in no way prejudice the defendants, and on the contrary, would save them evaporation loss for a period. It
also shows the fluctuations of the lake with reference to
inflow and evaporation. It is demonstrated that the maximum inflow into Utah Lake was reached in March of 1939
before any high water runoff, and that the inflow decreased
during the entire high water runoff and did not begin to
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increase again until Septe1nber when the creek flow had decreased to 16.8 second feet, or 1,000 acre feet per month.
This same ground condition occurred each year, showing
that the great mass of inflow occurred after September first,
and that holding back from the irrigators' seasonal use 1,000
acre feet during April and May, and releasing it for use in
July as is contemplated, will not affect the inflow into the
lake during the warm months, because the April and May
water does not increase in flow until September or after\Vards. The graphic chart also shows that the lake is at
its low point ordinarily after October first. Evaporation is
highest in July and lowest in December and January. The
lake is at its highest in April and May and the ground water
inflow is at its peak during the fall and winter months.
POINTS PRESENTED AND RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS'
POSITION:
Respondents may, by a change of the nature of use
application, acquire the right to temporarily store water
the direct flow of which has heretofore been appropriated
by them and thereafter release such water for irrigation
within the same area, when such change can be made without impairing any vested or existing rights, and will serve
to prevent waste and permit a more beneficial use of the
water, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants
are in no position to complain because frequently they do
not utilize the rights which they claim might be impaired
anq must release water which they impound, into Great
Salt Lake.
II. The record discloses that the proposed plan for diversion and storage will not interfere with the rights of the
I.
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lower users, either as to volume, time of use or otherwise.
III. The proposed plan of diversion, storage and distribution (1) can be so administered as to insure that the
rights of lower users will not be injuriously affected and if
affected, that the appellants retain adequate remedies to
protect their rights; (2) the State Engineer's determination
that the application cannot be so administered as to avoid
such injury is not supported by the evidence, has been abandoned by the State Engineer through failure to adduce any
evidence in support thereof and has been properly reversed
by the findings and judgment of the court based upon the
evidence and the law; and (3) the State Engineer's decision
is subject to the findings and judgment of the court on a
trial de novo as provided by the express terms of the statute and as required by our system of law.
ARGUMENT
Appellants at the outset of their argument quote at
length from the decision of the State Engineer rejecting respondents' application. It is our position that this decision
has no legal effect because it has been appealed from and
after trial de novo, the District Court, having jurisdiction,
has reversed the decision as provided by law and made findings contrary thereto which are binding upon all parties, including the State Engineer.
We will reserve a further discussion of this matter for
Point III below. It is our position that this decision has no
persuasive effect because it is unsound both as a matter of
fact and law and we think this will be shown under Points
I and II below.
However, in connection with this decision, at the outset
we wish to refer to a few significant matters. In quoting
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the State Engineer's decision on page 21 of their brief, following the sentence "Other flow rights may also be supplied
in part in this same manner", appellants have omitted the
sentence in the Engineer's decision reading as follows:
"However in this instance it has not been shown
that other flow rights on the source might be adversely
affected."
The appellants at the trial put in evidence their primary claims, subject only to respondents' rights and there
was no protest or appearance by the owners of various secondary rights under Utah Lake. It was conceded at the
trial by appellants and it would follow by the very nature
of priority that if any users under the Utah Lake might conceivably be affected, they would be the owners of these inferior rights, and there was no showing at any time that the
appellants would, themselves, suffer any prejudice whatsoever, even though the amount of water in Utah Lake were
measurably affected, which the evidence showed would not
be the case.
It also seems apparent that after writing the decision
in question, the State Engineer changed his mind about the
difficulty of administration, upon which fanciful difficulty
he seemed primarily to base his decision, or that his successor in office represented at the trial did not subscribe
to his views. Thus, while the answer of the Associated Canal
Companies affirmatively pled that the diversion and storage
applied for, if attempted, would be impossible of administration from the standpoint of use by plaintiffs, the State
Engineer made no such claim in his answer (R. 89 and 63).
To the contrary, while the State Engineer was represented
by counsel at the trial and his chief deputy, F. W. Cottrell,
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attended the trial (His initials corresponding to the "F.W.
C." who apparently dictated the State Engineer's original
decision, R. 55) at no time did the State Engineer's office
suggest at the trial, or introduce any evidence whatsoever
in support of the idea, that the office could not administer
the change and all indications were that after hearing the
evidence, Mr. Cottrell was convinced that the change could
be practically administered.
Indeed, the very basis of the decision must have been
considered quite far-fetched by the State Engineer after
mature consideration; we refer particularly to his language:
"A direct flow user can only use that portion to
which his right entitles him, subject to the vagaries of
weather, conditions of crop, etc. . . . . . the approval of the application granting the right to store
the water represented by flow rights would impose upon
an administrator the obligation of determining, as mentioned hereinbefore, when weather conditions on the
ground would or would not permit the use of water by
diversion in applying it to beneficial use and time when
the applicant would not or could not, by reason of other
conditions, use the water in whole or in part by direct
diversion. This determination from day to day and
from time to time would impose a practical impossibility
upon an administrator. .
"
We challenge this entire thesis as being wholly unrealistic, impractical and impossible of application. To apply
such nebulous standards in preventing the recognition of a
diligence or other right and to assume the burden of reducing or cutting off water rights from day to day because of
the vagaries of the weather or according to whether it
rained or shined or didn't shine, would entangle an administrator in a hopeless web of confusion and would impeach
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practically every adjudication of water rights in the history
of our state.
Repeatedly, in general adjudications and other adjudications the court has made specific awards by quantity and
period of use and on no stream in the state that we know
of has the State Engineer ever assumed to require a diverter
to reduce his flow from day to day, according to vagaries
of the weather. No application could ever be approved and,
indeed, no appropriation could ever be established if this
fanciful theory were applied, because the State Engineer
in practically every case, would have to say that the award
could not be administered because it would be impractical
to fluctuate the quantity diverted according to the vagaries
of the weather. Actually, the evidence showed in this case
as is pointed out in the Statement of Facts, that in the
American Fork area no interruption ·in the diversion and
use of water was indicated during rainy periods and if anything, the ground would absorb more water and the benefit
from irrigation was more pronounced during this period.
Be this as it may, the basis on which respondents' application was rejected by the State Engineer seems a wholly
i:r:supportable one.
Alike fallacious appears the State Engineer's attempt
to interpret the decided cases. His decision cites only two,
Tanner v. Humphreys, presumably the one reported in 87
Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484, and Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., et
al v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., et al, 104 Utah 202, 135
P.2d 108. Neither decision seems to support the conclusions of the State Engineer and on the contrary, both indicate a contrary conclusion.
In the Tanner case, supra, George M. Bacon, predecessor in office ofT. H. Humphreys, State Engineer, rejected
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the application of Esthma Tanner to change the point of
diversion of certain water of Provo Canyon. Mr. Bacon
had stated in his letter of rejection as follows: (The language closely following the reasons assigned in the instant
ca£e.)

"It would appear that this application goes way
beyond the usual allowance in the matter of changing
place and nature of use and is a definite enlargement
of usual right. The original right would primarily for
irrigation with the provision for culinary and domestic
use connected therewith. Any use for domestic and
municipal purposes in the non-irrigation season is limited by the court's decree and the requirement of this
office to that quantity which would be required for domestic and culinary purposes in non-irrigation seasons
in connection with the use of the balance of the right
for irrigation purposes."

On such reasoning, Mr. Bacon rejected the application
for a change of an irrigation right to a culinary right, and
an appeal was taken to the District Court. The case is further interesting because there, too, the successor in office
to the one making the decision in the State Engineer's office was defendant on the appeal, and there was a like
change in personnel in the instant case between the State
Engineer's decision and his appearance in the District Court.
The District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah
upheld the decision of the State Engineer and granted a nonsuit against Esthma Tanner but the Supreme Court reversed
the decision and sent the case back for re-trial, upon which
new trial the application was approved, thus permitting the
more beneficial use of water in accordance with the policy
of this state. Incidentally, the form of the approval of the
District Court upon the re-trial was substantially the same
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as the form of the decree in the instant case and subjected
the approval to the existing rights of the parties and without prejudice to the rights of any and all of the parties to
challenge the nature and extent of, or limitation upon, or
the use of any of the water rights of said parties in and to
the waters of Provo River.
The Supreme Court decision laid down the rule that in
proceedings to change the point of diversion and nature of
use of a water right the plaintiff was entitled to have her
application granted if the point of diversion and nature of
use could be changed without affecting the vested rights
of the defendant, or if a decree could be made containing
conditions which would safeguard the rights of the defendant; that plaintiff was not required to introduce evidence
that there was unappropriated waters in the tributaries
from which the diversion was sought or that there was sufficient water in the tributaries to make an exchange since
the plaintiff would be permitted to divert only as much water as she was entitled to have by-passed on her account at
defendant's dam, and that it was not necessary for the applicant to make a showing that the water right had been
beneficially used but it would be assumed that the water
that had been used upon the land for which it was diverted
had been beneficially used. Implicit in the opinion of this
court is the further proposition that even though the applicant could not show a right to the use of all of the water
that she sought to change, yet her application should be
granted so that she could change, under her application,
such right as she might have.
The case of Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., et al v. Kents
Lake and Reservoir Co., et al, supra, which is the only other
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sition which seems to be a basis of the Engineer's decision.
It was argued that the application should not be approved
since it would place the applicant in a position to impair
the rights of others if it did not administer the change properly. The Supreme Court said in response to such a contention:
"In the light of our policy of encouraging the development of water right and the putting of water to
a beneficial use, we should not deny this application
simply because it puts Kents Lake in a position, as the
upstream junior appropriator, where it might, when
sufficient water was not available for all concerned,
interfere with the plaintiff's rights . . . . ."
By way of summation upon this phase, occasioned by
the setting out of the decision of the State Engineer in appellants' brief, it appears that the decision of the State Engineer should have been superceded by a judicial determination. It has been so superceded. We now proceed to the
points indicating that the judicial determinaion of the District Court was correct and that it should stand wihout reference to the initial decision of the State Engineer.
Point I. Respondents may by a change of nature -~of
use application acquire the right to temporarily store water
the dir~t flow of which has been appropriated heretofore
by them and thereafter release such water for irrigation
within the same area, when such change can be made without impairing any vested or existing rights and will serve
to prevent waste and pennit a more beneficial use of the
water, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants
are in no position to complain becaus.e frequently they are
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not able to utilize the right which they claim might be impaired.

The argument of appellants seems to be that respondents' application for storage is really not a change application but an application to appropriate, and cannot be granted in its present form. Sec. 100-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is cited to the effect that storage of water by
means of a reservoir shall be regarded as a diversion. Granted that there may be an original application to appropriate
water by means of storage, this does not mean that a direct flow right cannot be changed to a storage right without
being an original appropriation any more than it means that
a direct flow right for one use cannot be changed to a direct flow right for another use without it being deemed an
o:dginal appropriation. Granted too, that the water right
caneot be enlarged by means of a change application, yet
by the very nature of the change application, it can be
changed and a different use or a different manner of use
adopted. That is the very purpose of a change application.
No enlargement of any right is sought by respondents;
the State Engineer, as well as all of the defendants before
the District Court, conceded that the respondents had a primary right to substantially all of the flow of American Fork
River, at least with the exception of extremely high water.
The purpose of the application is simply to change the nature of use of a small quantity of that water and the change
is limited to that water which the respondents have, for
more than sixty years, beneficially used and through such
beneficial use, have heretofore appropriated.
Sec. 100-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides that:
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"Any person entitled to the use of water may
change the place of diversion or use and may use the
water for other purposes than those for which it was
originally appropriated, but no such change shall be
made if it impairs any vested rights without just compensation."
Appellants cite the opinion of Justice Wolfe in Moyle,
et al v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201,176 P.2d 882. The majority of the Court in that case determined that in a condemnation of proceeding the owner of a water right was entitled to its valuation on the basis of its highest and best
use, independent of any change application. The dissenting
opinion itself recognized the basis of respondents' rights
here, inasmuch as it is implicit in that opinion that by means
of a change application, right to a new phase of use which
may be entirely different from that upon which the original
appropriation is based, may be acquired through filing an
application with the State Engineer subject only to existing
rights.
Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484, supra,
as stated by the Court (p. 485) involved the rejection of an
application by the State Engineer, "Requesting the permission to change the place and nature of use of a decreed water right on Provo River." While in effect an exchange of
water was contemplated, the change application was deemed
entirely appropriate.
Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., et al v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., et al, 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108, supra, involved
an application to change the place of storage out of previously awarded senior storage rights and also an application
to appropriate allegedly unappropriated water. Nothing is
sought in respondents' application that cannot be accom-
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plished by a change in the nature and use and the application clearly states the change contemplated. As indicated
in Tanner v. Humphreys, supra, it is no reason for denying the application that the applicant may nat have all
the water it claims since the change can be made out of the
water right it does have.
Appellants are disturbed about the introduction of the
evidence which shows that over the period for which data
is available, by reason of the limited storage capacity of
Utah Lake during the high-water period, substantial quantities of water have had to be released from Utah Lake and
wasted into Great Salt Lake for 50% of these years, and
particularly that during the past few years, large quantities of water, many times the amount sought to be held
back, have had to be wasted into Great Salt Lake because
of excess early inflow into the lake. They say that such
wastage is beyond their control and pursuant to a court decree establishing compromise point. They argue that by
showing this wastage, respondents are seeking to make an
original appropriation thereof or accomplish an exchange.
It may be granted that this wastage is beyond appellants' control; nevertheless, it is a fact that huge quantities
of water are wasted into Great Salt Lake during the early
run-off period which quantities dwarf respondents' proposed
hold-back without even considering the contemplated later
release of the water to the area in question. But respondents are not proposing to appropriate such wastage; they
are merely pointing out that appellants are in no position
to object to the proposed change under any theory, at least
during the time such wastage is being carried on, or when
such wastage affects the supply in Utah Lake during any
hold-back in the high-water season in which accretions to
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th2 lake are being wasted into the Great Salt Lake. There
can be no interference with plaintiffs' rights under the claim
that the inflow during such period was. thereby affected, no
matter how fanciful such claim might be, and the change
could thus be made without a semblance of a claim that
their vested or other rights would be impaired.
This point could more properly be discussed under the
next heading involving the question of the claimed impairment of vested rights, but since appellants mentioned it under the division corresponding to the present point, we refer to it here. It is no doubt mentioned by appellants in
support of their contention that respondents' application
is not in fact a change application. It ·must be apparent,
however, that respondents are not seeking to appropriate
the thousands upon thousands of acre feet that are wasted
annually into Great Salt Lake since the change is limited
to that flow of water which respondents themselves have
beneficially used and which, to the extent of 1,000 acre feet
annually, they seek to temporarily hold back.
AJppellants intimate that the court granted the application of respondents solely by reason of such wastage.
This, of course, is not the case, as a reference to the evidence
and the finding~ will clearly indicate; because, apart from
this wastage, it is apparent that the proposed hold-back
would impair in no sense any vested or existing right of the
appellants; but on this point, it is also apparent that there
could be no possible justification for the outright rejection
of appellants' application, since during such period as the
wastage occurs, there would be no reason at all why the
proposed change should not be allowed. For example, assuming that the capacity of Utah Lake was such that during all of April, May and June, instead of during a part of
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that period, all of the inflow into Utah Lake would have to
be turned out and wasted into Great Salt Lake by reason
of limited capacity. Would anyone contend that appellants
could object to the respondents' hold-back of their own water during such period in order to permit its more beneficial
use? This is only one minor phase of the case, but it nevetheless is another indication why respondents' application
should be granted in the interest of a more beneficial utilization of their own water right.
It has been announced repeatedly, not only in courts
of this state but by the courts of all the western states, that
the right to the use of water is a property right, with all the
incidents of ownership and, with such rights, the owner may
use the same for his own beneficial purposes, limited only
by the obligation to comply with regufations as to change
of use through the office of the State Engineer and by his
duty not to interfere with other vested rights. It is also elementary that water cannot be applied to irrigation of land
in the usual way, and the way authorized by law, except
that of necessity there is seepage and run-off; but that the
owner of the right is entitled to use the same with reasonable care without losing his interest or rights to others by
appropriation, prescription or otherwise.
Mr. Kinney, in his work on "Irrigation and Water
Rights," expresses the principle as follows:
"The authorities hold that while water so denominated as waste water may be used after it escapes, no
permanent right can be acquired to have the discharge
kept up, either by appropriation, or right by prescription, estoppel or acquiescence in its use while it is escaping, and that even though expensive ditches or
works are constructed for the purpose of utilizing such
. in other words, the original
waste water .
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appropriators have the right, and in fact, it is their duty to prevent, as far as possible, all waste of the water
which they have appropriated."
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, Vol. 2, par. 661, pp.
1150-1153; see also par. 1125, p. 2084.
See also Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867;
Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins.
Co .. , et al, 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866.
Incident to right to the use of water is the right to put
the same to the best possible use, even though such use requires the temporary storage of water from one period to
another. In discussing that question, Judge Kinney, among
other things, states:
"The existence of the right to store water as long
as it did not interfere with the vested rights of qthers
has long been recognized in the courts . . . ." 2
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, par. 844, p.
1480.
In this connection he cites the opinion of Judge Gabbert
of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, in Seven
Lakes Res. Co. v. New Loveland & Greeley Irr. & Land Co.,
93 Pac. 485, wherein it is stated:
"It appears from the record that the stockholders
of appellant, instead of planting crops which require
irrigation during the early part of the season, utilize
their lands by growing crops which do not require irrigation until about August, when the direct supply
through the ditches is not sufficient to furnish the volume of water necessary to irrigate such crops. And so,
instead of applying the water to which they are entitled
for direct irrigation in the early part of the season, they
~_;tore this water for use later to mature crops, like beets

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
and potatoes, which do not require irrigation until about
the month of August. It would be unfortunate indeed
if the law were such that it could not be adapted to
changed conditions resulting from the character of
crops grown by those engaged in agricultural pursuits.
If water for direct irrigation can only be utilized for
that purpose, the result would be to retard agricultural
progress, and limit the growth of agricultural products
to those which can be matured by means of direct irrigation early in the season. If the judgment of the trial
court should be sustained upon the theory that one owning a priority for direct irrigation may not cease to
utilize it for the purpose upon crops in May, June and
July, and store it for use during the same season thereafter, the result would be to take from the owner of
such a priority his rights and confer them upon others
growing crops of a different nature. Such a rule would
make the right to the use of water dependent upon the.
character of crops grown insted of upon the right to
utilize it in any manner which does not injuriously affect the vested rights of others."
The same principle is enunciated in the case of Greeley
Loveland Irr. Co. et al v. Farmers' Pawnee Ditch C'o., 146
Pac. 247, particularly at 252. These decisions have been
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of this state
in the case of Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal
Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852. In the course of the opinion, Harold M. Stevens, speaking for the Supreme Court of
this state, among other things, said:
"With respect to the second theory advanced by
respondents it is undoubtedly true that a distinction
may be drawn between direct irrigation for immediate
use on the one hand and storage for future use on the
other. Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 2nd
Ed., para. 844, and the right of the owner of a priority
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for direct irrigation to store his water for later seasonal use has been sustained. Seven Lakes Res. Co. v.
New Loveland and Greeley Irr. and Land Co., 40 Colo.
382, 93 Pac. 485, 17 LRS (NS) 329 and see note to Water Supply and Storage Co. v. Larimer and Wells Irrigation Co., (Colo) 46 LRA 322. Such right to change
the purpose of use is to be sustained as is the right to
change the means of use, place of use and point of diversion upon the theory that the right of enjoyment
is independent of the mode but it is well settled and entirely elementary that all changes in the mode of enjoyment must in no event violate the maxim sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas.
"That qualification is plainly set forth in Seven
Lakes Res. Co. v. New Loveland and Greeley Irr. and
Land Co., cited supra, where at page 331 of 17 LRA
(NS), the Justice in delivering the opinion of the court
said, 'A priority to the use of water is a proprty right,
which is the subject of purchase and sale, and its character and method of use may be changed, providing
that such change does not injuriously affect the rights
of others.' "
Sec. 100-11-1, UCA, 1943, declares that the policy of
the state is to obtain from water in Utah the highest duty
for domestic uses and irrigation of lands in Utah within the
terms of interstate compacts or otherwise. The other cases
cited by appellants negative neither the right to make a
change under the form of application filed by respondents,
nor the duty of the State Engineer to approve such change.
The case of Eardley v. Terry, et al, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d
362, is cited by appellants for the proposition that the District Court which hears the matter de novo can do no more
than the State Engineer. In the instant case, the District
Court did exactly what the State Engineer had the power
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to do, and we submit had the duty to do. The Eardley case
further shows that in acting upon an application to appropriate water, the State Engineer should, and if he fails to do
so, the court will, approve the application if there is reasonable prospect that the appropriation can be effected in the
future without detriment to existing rights; and that the
beneficial use of water is so important that doubts should
be resolved in favor of the applicant.
Appellants contended at the trial that there was a different rule applying to change applications; that the proof
must negative any possibility of detriment, however minor.
In its brief before this Court, it adds the further proposition
that even then, if the State Engineer has denied a change
application on a question of fact, such decision is binding on
the District Court in effect. Both interpretations seem
wholly unsupported under the statutes, as well as in view
of the decisions of this Court.
Sec. 100-3-8, UCA, 1943, provides for the approval or
rejection of both original applications to appropriate, and
change applications, outlining the duty of the State Engineer with respect to both. They are considered on the
same basis in the statute. Every reason for encouraging
the utilization of unappropriated water applies to the more
beneficial use of water that has already been appropriated.
The same principle is specifically applied to change application in the case of Tanner v. Humphreys, supra. In
doubtful cases it has been held that an application to appropriate should be approved, since the policy of the law is
to prevent waste and to promote the largest beneficial use
of water. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah
243, 289 Pac. 116. The Kimball and Terry cases cited above
were followed and approved in Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents
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Lake & Res. Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108, rehearing denied 104 Utah 216, 140 P.2d 638, and in Whitmore v. Welch,
_ _ _Utah
, 201 P.2d 954.
Unless there is no reasonable probability that the
change can be affected without impairing the vested or existing rights of others, the change should be allowed. The
change in the case at bar has been allowed by the District
Court on a trial de novo sitting as a court of equity, which
had the opportunity of observing and hearing first~hand all
of the testimony in the case and which, upon the great preponderance of the evidence, has found that the change can
be effected and administered without detriment to existing
or vested rights.
Point II. The recQrd discloses that the proposed plan
for diversion and sto.rage would not interfere with the rights
of the lower users either as to volume, time of use or otherwise.
A. Z. Richards, an engineer of extensive knowledge and
experience, not only involving irrigation problems generally,
but involving the specific area in question, testified after
explaining the proposed plan in detail, that in his judgment
it was feasible and very well planned (Tr. 119). He further
testified that the diversion and the storage of water under
the application would not affect the availability of water to
irrigators from Utah Lake to any substantial degree, and
it was his best judgment that there would be no detriment
or damage to them (Tr. 124); that if the water is held and
used later in the season as proposed there is just as much
likelihood that it will reach the lake as if it were used with
a larger amount through the same system earlier in the
season (Tr. 128-129); that the water later in the year would
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be used on a reduced acreage and loss by transpiration and
evaporation would not be so great (Tr. 129). It further appeared that if there were any theoretical effect upon the
lake from the operation of the proposed plan under any conceivable theory, inferior rights and not defendants' rights
would be affected (Tr. 136).
The only other experts appearing were Mr. Gardner and
Mr. Earl. As pointed out heretofore, Mr. Earl's lack of
knowledge concerning the area involved and his confusing
and conflicting testimony make it difficult, if not impossible,
to give any weight thereto.
Upon the basis of Mr. Gardner's testimony alone---and
he, too, was a witness for appellants-it became clear that
there would be no detriment to appellants by reason of the
proposed change. His testimony that the hold-back would
affect Utah Lake was based on the assumption that there
would be no release of the water from the Silver Lake Basin
reservoir, which assumption, of course, was contrary to the
basic plan of the application and not justified by the evidence. He testified that he understood from the questions
put to him that if 35 second feet of water were held in Silver
Lake Basin indefinitely, there would be a loss to Utah Lake
(Tr. 248) and he stated that he did not understand that Mr.
Mulliner's question also involved the release of water (Tr.
247). He further expressly stated that he would not attempt to answer the percentage of loss if the water were
withheld a month or so (Tr. 249) and he stated that if it
were held back in June and released in July, the loss wouldn't
be "too great" (Tr. 250). It wouldn't be "too substantial"
(Tr. 250).
He summarized the entire matter when he stated that
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proximately half of the water that is applied to the land ultimately finds its way into Utah Lake for the whole period
of .the year" (Tr. 252). He further stated that it would be
difficult to differentiate between one period and another (Tr.
252; that he had no judgment as to the rate of the ground
water movement (Tr. 252) but that the loss to the ground
water would be small (Tr. 253). The fair intendment of his
testimony was that no matter when the water was applied,
about 50% would ultimately reach the lake and as far as
the quantity reaching the lake was concerned it would make
no difference as to whether it was applied in one month or
another. He further testified that any water that is contributed to the lake, contrn:mtes to the general supply and
he didn't see that it made any difference when it came in.
"Utah Lake has a certain supply to meet and whether it
comes in May, June, July or August, there still has to be
that much water in the lake to supply it" (Tr. 253). He
thought it would be preferable to have the accretion come
in late in the season and not be subject to evaporation before the maximum drain-off occurred (Tr. 254).
It thus is apparent that any hold-back would contribute
to the lake to substantially the same extent as if there were
no hold-back and that as a matter of fact, a later accretion
would be just as advantageous to the lower users, if not more
so. This fact is borne out by the graphs shown in the record
indicating the highest level of the lake occurs about May
and that the bottom draw-off is reached sometime near
October first, when use for irrigation has been substantially
completed.
It was shown by Mr. Richards' testimony that the heavy run-off in the spring even under normal use and without
the hold-back does not commence to reach the lake until
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about the close of the irrigation season. The hold-over supply in the lake is just as important, or more so, than the supply during the summer, since there is never any assurance
as to what the next year will bring, and particularly during
a high run-off period, the uncertainties as to the next year
are a controlling matter.
Appellants express concern, although inferentially conceding that any effect upon the lake by the proposed application would be insubstantial, by saying that if such effect
were multiplied, it would become important. We believe
that the change application could be multiplied indefinitely
and the amount of usable water in the lake would not be sub- ,
stantially affected. Loss by evaporation might be reduced
and waste into Grea~ Salt Lake might be minimized. Neither
of these results would detrimentally affect any vested right.
Appellants' objection to the instant application would
b2 alike unjustified with respect to other applications; but
after all, each case must rest upon its own bottom and upon
the evidence before the court. The granting of the change
would in no wise preclude the appellants from the protection
of their rights should the application be administered so as
to cause detriment. It is abundantly shown that it need not
be so administered and under the plan of the respondents
would not be so administered.
The comment in the Kents Lake case is particularly applicable to the appellants' argument. "In the light of our
policy of encouraging the development of water rights and
the putting of water to a beneficial use, we should not deny
this application merely because it puts Kents Lake in a position, as the upstream appropriator, where it might, when
sufficient water was not available for all concerned, interfere with the plaintiff's rights."
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The appellants express concern about the mechanics of
the administration. Mr. Richards, an irrigation engineer of
large experience, rightly pointed out that there were difficulties in the administration of any water right, but that
there were no difficulties here which were not encountered
in any program of storage. If such difficulties were a reason for denying the greatest beneficial use of water, this region would have remained arid and the development of water
rlghts in this state, and our economy, would have been hopelessly retarded. The problem of holding back a thousand
acre feet in the reservoir, subject to measure by automatic
recording device or otherwise, and the release and utilization
of such water at a later date for use within the same area,
is one of ordinary water administration. If at any time, due
to excessive snow or otherwise, a somewhat excessive quantity of water should be held back on occasion for a day or
so, it would be a simple matter to turn down into the lake
out of the conceded rights of respondents a sufficient amount
of water to make that quantity up. No water distribution
is accomplished with the mathematical exactness which appellants seek to establish as a standard. Their own storage
problems could not be solved under such a standard, nor under such standard would the most simple direct flow use
prove feasible.
All of the objections, we believe, are in the fertile imagination of counsel and do not arise out of the evidence and
are not justified by it. The State Engineer made no showing at the trial as to any difficulty of administration and
claimed none in his pleadings, and we think it is reasonable
to suppose from the evidence that the successor in office of
the engineer who denied the application does not concur in
the idea his predecessor had in this respect. At least, there
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was nothing which was made to appear in the evidence which
refutes this asumption.
On page 44 of appellants' brief it is claimed that "Under
the change application here, the water withheld in any calendar year need not be released in that year at all." This
is typical of the calibre of the objections appellants have interposed. The proposed change can be so administered as
to prevent detriment to vested rights, and it should be approved, notwithstanding that conceivably, under some farfetched assumption, it might put the respondents in a position to interfere with the rights of others. But the applicaion fairly shows on its face that it is for only a seasonal
storage. If and when appellants' rights are invaded by such
an unusual interpretation, they will have their full remedy,
not only under the law as established by repeated decisions,
including the Eardley v. Terry case, supra, but also by the
e_:press terms of the judgment itself.
We call attention to defendants' exhibit 14, which contained forms of approval already issued by the State Engineer on certificates of appropriation or change certificates
in appellants' favor. It is clear that in the instant case, the
District Court ordered plaintiffs' application approved in the
usual form. Thus, even Kennecott Copper Corporation's
final change certificate No. A-110 provides that the rights
evidenced by this certificate are restricted to the change of
place and nature of use and in no way establish or validate
the water rights claimed by applicant. The last certificate
contained in exhibit 14 provides that the State Engineer certified that said appropriator is entitled to change the place
and purpose of use of water as therein set out, "subject to
prior rights, if any, and including those junior to the original aplication .
"
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Respondents' change application having been approved,
they are in a position to proceed with the actual change and
upon submitting their proof, and it appearing that no detriment has been suffered by the appellants or others, a similar certificate of change wil be issued. None of the appellants' rights can in any way be prejudiced. As pointed out
heretofore, the evidence indicates that there are rights under Utah Lake inferior to those of appellants. These rights
have made no protest and there was no showing as to any
detrimental effect that the change would have on them.
Rights, if any, that would be affected at all would be these
inferior to appellants' rights. In fact, in the brief of appellants, these inferior rights, not represented in the case, are
mentioned, and imaginary effects upon them conjured up.
Attention is called to the case of Whitmore v. Welch, supra,
wherein the trial court, in holding that the applications in
question should be granted, made it subject to the condition
that the rights of another applicant, not directly involved
in the suit should be determined. The Supreme Court held
that this condition in the judgment was "unwarranted".
Again, we come to the fact that the appellants, while
claiming mere possibilities of detriment, attempt to avoid the
effect of their wastage of water into Great Salt Lake. While
attempting to hold the respondents to the strict rule of the
limitation of water rights by day to day changes in the
weather, they assert, in effect, that there are no limitations upon their own right, including the limitation of beneficial use.
It has been repeatedly declared in the Utah cases that
in this arid region, water is too valuable to permit unnecessary waste. No water that is sought to be applied to a beneficial use or purpose should be permitted to go to waste un-
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less it cannot be so applied without interfering with the prior
rights of other users. Salt Lake City, et al v. Gardner, 39
Utah 30, 114 Pac. 147.
No one can acquire a vested right to waste water. It
is of the utmost importance to remember that no one can
acquire an absolute right to waste water as he can to other
property. A person having title to property generally may
waste it or destroy it, but he may not do so with water. Eden
Irr. Co. v. District Court of Weber County, 61 Utah 103, 211
Pac. 957.
To make waste the subject of inquiry in every adjudication would injure no person in his rights, for no one can
have a right to waste water, and it would aid in bringing
about the largest possible beneficial use of the water of the
state. Mammoth Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Burton, Judge,
70 Utah 239, 259 Pac. 408.
Sec. 100-1-3, UCA, 1943, provides that the beneficial use
of water shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all
rights to the use of water in this state.
Mere assertions of possible detriment should not prevent
'a beneficial change. We quote from Sec. 873, p. 1538, Vol. 2,
Kinney on Irrigation & Water Rights, under the heading,
"The Nature and Extent of Injuries to Others Which Will
Prevent Changes":
"A water right being a property right of the highest order, its owner may do what he wishes with his
own including the making of such changes as he sees fit
to make provided that he does not materially injure the
rights of others in making them. It is evident that no
rule can be laid down which can govern every rule attempted but that whether the change should or should
not be allowed is a question of fact and is to be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding
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each particular case. The principal question to be determined in cases of this nature is whether or not any
other appropriators' rights are injured by the change.
The restriction to the right to the change that others
must not be injured by the change is a matter of defense; and therefore the burden of proof showing that
injuries have been done to the rights of others is upon
the one seeking an damages and injuries actually committed or seeking an injunction against contemplated injuries. There is no presumption that a greater quantity
of water was diverted or is about to be diverted after the
change than was diverted before, even if the water is
used to irrigate a greater acreage after the change than
if irrigated before; nor under this state of facts will it
be presumed that the vested rights of others have been
or will be injured by the change; injury to the rights of
others must be proven as is any other fact by the party
alleging the injury."
See also Tanner v. Humphreys, supra, and Eardley v.
Terry, supra.
Substantial injury is required to prevent a change; not
a mere speculative injury, but one real and actual. No such
prospective injury appears. No injury has been shown unless by some extraordinary or unusual administration respondents infringe upon appellants' rights, beyond the necessary scope of their plan. This they do not intend to do. If
they do, the law and the court's judgment itself afford appellants adequate remedy. If they do not, they should be
permitted to attempt a more beneficial utilization of their
own water rights, not only in their own interests but in furtherance of the public policy of this state.
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Point Ill. The pro~ plan of div.ersion, storage and
distribution can be so administered as to insure that the
rights of lower users will not be injuriously affected. The
State Engineer's assertion in his decision that it cannot be
so administered as to avoid such injury is not supported by
the evidence, has been abandoned by the State Engineer
through failure to adduce any evidence in support the,reof,
has been properly overcome by the findings and judgment of
the triaJ court based on the evidence, and is subject to the
findings and judgment of the court on the trial de novo.
The appellants refer to the history of control of water
rights through the State Engineer's office and seek to place
respondents in the position of denying the proper authority
of the State Engineer. Thus on p. 46 of their brief they
state, "Dealing with the claim of respondents that they have
the right to and can administer this water as was largely
done when water was regulated by court decrees alone .... "
and on page 51, "The respondents' contention on this, as
adopted in the findings are, first: that they own and have a
right to control and administer the waters of American Fork
Creek . .
." It is true that respondents claim and are
entitled to the right to the use of the waters of the American Fork Creek to the full extent of their diligence appropriation, subject to the State Engineer's proper jurisdiction
and in accordance with law. The facts that respondents filed
their application for change with the State Engineer and in
accordance with law, appealed the decision to the District
Court, relying upon their rights under the law, indicate their
position. The findings of the court speak for themselves to
d2ny the unjustified interpretation of appellants.
Respondents further deny the proposition advanced by
appellants-a proposition not justified by the laws of the
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State of Utah nor as conceded by appellants by any adjudicated cases-that when the State Engineer made his initial
determination denying an application such determination
must stand, and is binding upon the courts, despite procedures for review through a trial de novo. Such a proposition .
is repugnant to our entire system of water control, as well as
to our fundamental concepts involving the judicial power.
It is further directly opposed to the express provisions of the
statutes.
In attempting to follow appellants' devious argument,
we note their inference that upon this change being granted,
the rights of respondents will initially come under the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. The fact is that respondents'
rights have been under that jurisdiction for many years past
in the operation of their existing system, and. the regulations
and control of that office will be no different by reason of
the fact that a small storage reservoir is established. Appellants infer that the State Engineer upon the granting of the
change applicaion will have the duty of minutely following
each development to assure that no drop of water is misplaced. By the same token, it may be argued that under the
existing irrigation system of respondents the State Engineer
must follow each stream of water every day, depending upon the vagaries of the weather and must determine that it
is not applied upon bench land when it should be applied a
rod or so, or a mile or so further down.
The proposed change can be administered like any other
right under the jurisdiction of the State Engineer and there
are no more difficulties inherent in the administration of the
change than there have been for many years in the administration of the waters of American Fork River. These
have involved the diversion, control and distribution
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of the river between these companies and other interested
usrs, and the return flow, if any, into Utah Lake as it is affected by such distribution. How have the appellants or the
State Engineer determined in the past that the respondents
have not diverted from the natural channel more water than
they are entitled to, and how will they so determine that fact
in the future? It will be no more complicated an administrative problem with the change granted than it would be
otherwise, and in fact, because of the additional measuring
devices that will be required, a closer control will be more
readily possible. All of the fancied difficulties in measuring
and checking the Silver Lake hold-back have been, and will
be, present to a greater or less extent in any irrigation proj2ct. The difficulties will be infinitely less than on numerous other irrigation systems. The distribution of the waters
of Utah Lake itself are an example of a most complex one,
where the idea of exactness in diversion would be deemed
fantastic and where theoretical objections must give way to
practical formula to permit the beneficial use of water. Deer
Creek, involving repeated hold-backs and subsequent release
d2mands by a large number of irrigation companies could
not operate at all under the limitations and standards sought
to be applied by appellants as against the respondents. There
is not a single stream in the state furnishing water to more
than a few irrigators which does not involve problems which,
measured by these .impractical standards, would be insurmountable.
We have already pointed out the testimony before the
court showing the practical operation of the planned holdback and the complete absence of testimony on the part of
the State Engineer as to the impracticability of administration. Nevertheless, the appellants finally urge that the
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State Engineer, as an administrative officer in making the
determination that the application should be rejected for
the reason that it would be allegedly impractical of administration, has established a decision which the court, irrespective of the evidence before it, is powerless to disturb.
This contention may be gilded as it is in the brief by scholarly references to the theory of state administration and
the knowledge and experience of the State Engineer. but
the fact remains that the statute provides expressly for the
power to decide in a trial de novo that which the appellants
contend against, and the decisions of this court lend no
support to the thought that the statues can be disregarded.
Referring in great length to other statutes and other
statutory principles and systems having no bearing upon the
problem, appellants in only a cursory manner mention the
statutes involved here. It is not necessary, as appellants
have done, to seek in the general authorities or statutes and
cases governing certiorari or similar extraordinary proceedings the rules determining the powers of the District Court
on a trial de novo in reviewing a decision of the State Engineer. The answer is in the water law itself, made doubly
clear by the decided cases, and he who runs may read.
Section 100-3-14, UCA, 1943, concerning "Review by
Courts of Engineer's Decisions," provides:
"In any case where a decision of the state engineer
is involved any persan aggrieved by such decision may
within sixty days after notice thereof bring a civil action in the district court for a plenary review thereof.
The state engineer shall give notice of his decision by
mailing a copy thereof by regular mail to the applicant
and to each protestant and notice shall be deemed to
have been given on the date of mailing. The place of
trial, subject to the power of the court to change the
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same as provided by law, shall be in the county in which
the stream or water source, or some part thereof, is located. The state engineer must be joined as a defandant in all suits to review his decisions, but no judgment
for costs or expenses of the litigation shall be rendered
against him. Parties shall be served with process as in
other cases and notice of the pendency of such action
shall be filed by the clerk of the district court with
the state engineer within twenty days after the same
is commenced which shall operate to stay all further
proceedings pending the decision of the district court."
Section 100-3-15, UCA, 1943, further dealing with the
review by trial de novo, continues:
"The pleadings, practice and procedure in suits to
review decisions of the state engineer shall be the same
as in other equity cases. The hearing in the district
court shall proceed as a trial de novo and shall be tried
to the court as other equitable actions. Within ten
days after its entry a copy of the judgment shall be
transmitted by the clerk of the district court to the office of the state engineer. An action to review a decision of the state engineer shall be dismissed upon application of any party or the court on its own motion
if the complaint was not filed or the summons was not
served within sixty days after notice of the decision

,

Appellants do not expressly say that the decision of the
State Engineer cannot be reviewed under any circumstances,
but they argue that on fact questions his decision is entitled
to great weight, if indeed it is not controlling. Then they
approach their inferred conclusion from a different angle
by urging that on the question of whether the plan is feasible or could be administered the decision is conclusive, since
the engineer is in a better position to know, than the court.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

54

We deny the later premise as well as the other propositions
advanced by appellants. When the court has the benefit,
not only of all the data available to the State Engineer or
his deputy who formulated the decision, but of all data available to all of the other parties and their witnesses collectively, we believe it is in a much better position than the
State Engineer to make a fair and complete determination.
Particularly does this seem true, where as here, apparently
the basis of the State Engineer's original determination was
so insupportable that he made no showing in justification of
his judgment before the District Court although properly
summoned and appearing as a party. But be this as it may,
and no matter how much the State Engineer might have
contributed to the knowledge of the court, the fact is that
upon the appeal, the decision was the court's responsibility
and that decision is not only binding upon the State Engineer
but upon the parties here, subject only to a review by this
Court in the manner provided for the review of other equitable actions.
The appellants' argument emphasizes the particular
qualification of the State Engineer to know whether the plan
is feasible. The same thing might be said about his qualification to know whether there is any unappropriated water
in the proposed source of supply in connection with an original application, or to know whether the proposed use would
or would not impair any vested right, and what has been said
by appellants about his judgment on administration would
apply as to his judgment on other matters. Yet, as to all
these matters, to the extent they were properly before the
State Engineer, the District Court had full jurisdiction on the
trial de novo. The question of feasibility, to the extent it
was before the State Engineer, and before the District Court.
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~s

in no different position than the other questions they had
to decide.
Section 100-3-8, UCA, 1943, governs the action of the
State Engineer both on applications to appropriate and
change applications, and insofar as material to this argument, reads:
"It shall be the duty of the State Engineer, upon
payment of the approval fee, to approve an application
if (1} There is unappropriated water in the proposed
source; (2) The proposed use will not impair existing
rights, or interfere with the more beneficial use of the
water; (3) The proposed plan is physically and economically feasible unless the application is filed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation and would not prove
detrimental to the public welfare; and (4) The applicant
has the financial ability to complete the proposed works
and the application was filed in good faith and not for
purposes of speculation or monopoly; provided, that
where the State Engineer, because of information in his
possession obtained either by his own investigation or
otherwise, has reason to believe that an application to
appropriate water will interfere with its more beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or mining development or manufacturing,
or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it shall
be his duty to withhold his aproval or rejection of the
application until he shall have investigater the matter

,

It will be seen that if certain facts exist it is the duty
of the State Engineer to approve the application.

We will
pause to argue whether the· views of the State Engineer on whether the change could be readily administered
would justify rejection by the State Engineer in any case;
Let us assume that the claimed difficulty of administration
no~
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falls under the subject of "feasibility" referred to in the
statute, for the sake of argument. The question of feasibility is in exactly the same position as the question of impairment of other rights, or in the case of an application to
appropriate, the question of whether there is any unappropriated water. It is only under the provision of the last
quoted statute, where the State Engineer from his investigation or otherwise ". . . has reason to believe that
an application to appropriate water will interfere with its
more beneficial use", that the opinion of the State Engineer, as such, is given any weight. Even then, whether
such belief was justified and whether that phase of the
statute will be applied, still is a matter for judicial determination upon an appeal from the decision of the State Engineer, and the question will be decided de novo. See Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957. This phase of
the statute is not involved in our case.
On the other matters, including the matters before the
State Engineer in the instant case, this Court has repeatedly upheld the jurisdiction of the District Court on both
fact and law questions to make its determination de novo,
irrespective of what the State Engineer actually decided.
Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah
202, 135 P.2d 108, supra; Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367,
77 P.2d 367, supra; Little Cottonwood Water Co .. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 Pac. 116, supra; Whitmore v. Welch,
____Utah
, 201 P.2d 954, supra.
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d
748, clearly indicates that the same rule as to the State
Engineer's functions on an original application applies to
a change application. Eardley v. Terry, supra, cited in the
opinion, involved an original application, and the Whitmore
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case proper in connection with the matter quoted, involved
a change application. The court said (p. 750):
"A literal reading of the portion of the above section which we have italicized (Sec. 100-3-3, R.S.U.
1933) would lead one to believe that the determination of the state engineer ,approving or denying an
application for change of point of diversion adjudicated the rights of parties, since the act provided that no
such change shall be made 'if it impairs any vested
right, without just compensation', and it would appear
that a necessary implication is that the state engineer
must determine the existence or non-existence of such
vested rights before he acts, and that when he does
act and approves an application, that in so doing he has
found that no vested rights are impaired. However,
such a construction would fail to take cognizance of
the purposes of our Water and Irrigation Act and the
rights and duties of the state engineer as there set out.
The office of the state engineer was not created to adjudicate vested rights between parties, but to administer and supervise the appropriation of the waters of
the state. In Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d
362, this court considered the rights and duties of the
state engineer in approving or denying an application
for appropriation of water rights and we there held
that in fulfilling his duties he acts in an administrative
capacity only and has no authority to determine rights
of parties. The same reasoning applies to the extent
of the state engineer's authority when he determines
to grant or deny an application for change of diversion, use or place. It follows that in granting Murray
City the right to change its point of diversion and return, the state engineer did not adjudicate the priority
to the use of the water at the point of diversion, but
merely determined that it could use the water at that
point as long as it did not interfere with the prior
rights of others .
"
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Appellants cite the case of Garrison v. Davis, 88 Utah
358, 54 P.2d 439 in support of their contention that before
the District Court the recommendations of the State Engineer are entitled to great weight. The problem involved
in that case was an entirely different one, involving as it
did, the interpretation of an uncertain decree and it was a
wholly different case, being a general adjudication. The
context of the reference to the State Engineer will at once
show that the case does not support appellants' argument
as applied to the case at bar. We quote from page 443 of
the opinion:
"It will thus be observed that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine with any degree of certainty
just what the court below meant when it retained jurisdiction for the purpose of making 'minor corrections'.
That it retained jurisdiction for the purpose of making
corrections in the decree is clear, but it is by no means
clear as to the extent, if any, that the use of the word
'minor' limited the power of the court to make corrections. If resort be had to the whole record, as it may
be, for the purpose of removing doubt, we find that the
state engineer recommended 'that the court retain jurisdiction of this case for a period of five years for the
purpose of making adjustments in the duty of water,
correction of errors and for such other purposes as
time may indicate to the court as proper and just.'
While it may be that the trial court was not bound to
accept such recommendation, still in the light of the
fact that the state engineer collected the information
which formed the basis of the decree, the recommendation of the state engineer was entitled to great
weight.. In this connection it will be noted that Laws
of Utah, 1919, ch. 67, para. 33, directs that: 'If no contest on the part of any claimant or claimants shall have
been filed, the court shall render a judgment in accordance with such proposed determination', etc."
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In the instant case the statute expressly directs that
the court make a determination de novo, not that it shall
adopt the view of the State Engineer in the absence of protest. The reversing of such view is the very purpose of the
appeal and trial de novo. In the general adjudication suit,
the recommendation of the State Engineer was properly
before the court as the basis of the decree, in the absence
of protest at the hearing. In the case at bar, the State Engineer offered no evidence, nor were his views before the
court except as reflected in the very decision which it was
th court's duty to make anew.
It seems to us that the expression "trial de novo" is too
familiar on appeals from the City Court to the District
Court, both in criminal and civil cases, and the jurisdiction
of the court in actions in equity too well known, to require
any further belaboring of the point that the statute speaks
for itself as to the duties and powers of the District Court
on review of the decision of the State Engineer.

CONCLUSION
We submit that the contentions of appellants contrary
to the express terms of the statute and the decided cases
cannot be sustained. We further submit that as indicated
in the conclusion to Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones,
Utah
, 202 P.2d 892, the denial of respondents application would require the adoption of rules not consistent
with our statute and "not in conformity with the announced
policy of the state to liberally construe rights toward the
development and beneficial use of all waters of this state.
As stated in many of our cases and as indicated in the quotation from Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir
Co., supra, if no unappropriated water in fact exists (or
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more properly in the case at bar, if the change cannot be
effected Without impairing vested rights or cannot be administered-comment ours), then the defendant (applicant)
would get nothing. He of course will take subject to all existing rights.
. Against them it may well be that
the applicant will fall down in his attempt . . . . This,
however, is a matter to be adjudicated when the time comes
if these parties consider themselves aggrieved, or their
rights threatened."
The vitality of our water laws lies largely in their practicability and their adaptability to new developments and
necessities in the interest of an increasingly beneficial use
of available water supplies. The contentions sought to be
applied by appellants in this case, if adopted and applied
to their logical and full extent, would freeze the water economy of large areas in our state. They would put water
users in every mountain valley at the mercy of the owners
of storage rights below for no good reason. They would
make impossible the more beneficial use of water and would
throw into question valuable water rights dependent now
upon broad and practical, not narrow and hyper-technical,
administration. They would render our water resources
static rather than dynamic. Specifically, in connection with
appellants' argument that no matter how minute the effect might be, no change can be permitted, they would prevent transfer from ditch to ditch or from area to area within a small canal or river system because of some fanciful
and theoretical effect upon quantity or time of return flow.
They would make water rights as uncertain and transitory
as a cloudless sky. They would even make impossible the
operation of Deer Creek, impounding as it does "demand"
water resulting from the holding back of established rights
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for various canal companies. They would make the courts
merely an echo of the State Engineer's office in almost every case, and they would not only do violence to our existing system of water rights, but would throw into confusion
basic and accepted concepts on the essential separation of
powers..
The District Court should not have accepted such contentions and it did not. It is of the utmost importance to
all farmers and other water users throughout the state that
this Court does not accept them.
The respondents may, by a change of the nature of use
application, acquire the right to temporarily store water,
the direct flow of which has heretofore been appropriated
by them and thereafter release such water for irrigation
within the same area, when such change can be made without impairing any vested or existing rights, and will serve
to prevent waste and permit a more beneficial use of the
water, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants
a1·e in no position to complain because frequently they do
not utilize the rights which they claim might be impaired
and must release water which they impound into Great Salt
Lake. The record discloses that the proposed plan for
diversion and storage will not interfere with the rights of
the lower users, either as to volume, time of use or otherwise. The proposed plan of diversion, storage and distribution can be so administered as to insure that the
rights of lower users will not be injuriously affected; the
State Engineer's determination that the application cannot
be so administered as to avoid such injury is not supported
by the evidence, has been abandoned by the State Engineer
through failure to adduce any evidence in support thereof
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ment of the court based upon the evidence and the law;
and the State Engineer's decision is subject to the findings
and judgment of the court on a trial de novo, as provided
by the express terms of the statute and as required by our
system of law.
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed,
with costs.
Respectfully submitted,
A. H. CHRISTENSON
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
FOR CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON
Attorneys for Respondents
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